题目：When Myopic Managers Must Mark-to-Market

　　报告人：杨楠，香港理工大学，助理教授

　　时间：2018年10月24日(周三)9:00~11:00

　　地点：经管院B129

　　报告摘要如下：

　　We test a prominent theory that postulates managerial myopia is a mechanism by which mark-to-market accounting rules inducefirms to sell undervalued securities into negative liquidity shocks. While prior research finds a relation between mark-to-market rules and such liquidity feedback trading, we present new evidence tying it to managerial myopia. The length of time CEOs must wait to cash out stock and options holdings (CEO equity duration) reduces bank propensity to sell securities into negative liquidity shocks during the part of the subprime crisis governed by stricter mark-to-market rules. Long CEO equity durations also make banks less reluctant to impair securities after price-reducing liquidity shocks. We infer managerial myopia is a mechanism by which mark-to-market rules induce banks to sell into negative liquidity shocks to avoid impairments. Results from stock and bond event studies further support this inference.

　　报告人简介：

　　杨楠，香港理工大学会计与金融学院助理教授，2006年本科毕业于中国人民大学，2008年硕士毕业于State University of New York at Stony Brook，2015年博士毕业于Texas A&M University，获金融学博士学位，目前已在Journal of Financial Economics发表论文，并有多篇论文在审稿中。