一、议程 (Schedule)

二、报告人及文章摘要

1. 李欣明 (Prof. Xinming Li)

个人简介 (Bio)：南开大学金融学院助理教授，2019年毕业于南卡罗莱纳大学获得金融学博士，世界银行咨询专家，美国联邦储备委员会和银行监管者协会杰出青年学者，国际知名SSCI期刊Research in International Business and Finance银行区主编。其研究领域包括：银行流动性，银行业监管，银行破产，银行救助，金融危机，金融机构、公司金融，国际金融，跨国文化，一带一路等。其论文发表于Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Journal of Financial Intermediation，Journal of Corporate Finance等金融学顶级国际期刊。其著作发表于 The Oxford Handbook of Banking (3rd Edn) 。 同时也是Academy of International Business，Midwest Finance Association，Southern Finance Association，Financial Management Association，Eastern Finance Association，Northern Finance Association 等知名金融学、国际商务学国际学术会议委员会成员以及Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Financial Stability等众多知名金融学学术期刊匿名评审人。

文章题目 (Title)：Government Guarantees and Bank Liquidity Creation Around the World

文章摘要 (Abstract)：Governments provide guarantees to banks, such as deposit insurance, often increasing them during financial crises. While risk effects are well researched, impacts on bank output remain largely unexplored. We address these impacts using data from 75 countries on bank liquidity creation, a comprehensive bank output measure. We address the identification challenge of reverse causality by examining home country guarantee effects on liquidity creation of subsidiary banks in foreign host nations, and tackle omitted-variables concerns by specifying host country × year fixed effects. Our striking findings suggest that home-country guarantee increases decrease subsidiary bank liquidity creation by as much as 15%.

2. 沈吉 (Prof. Ji Shen)

个人简介 (Bio)：任教于北京大学光华管理学院金融学系。他在复旦大学物理学系获得理学学士，在北京大学获得经济学硕士，在伦敦政治经济学院获得金融学博士学位。目前主要的研究兴趣在有摩擦的金融市场资产定价理论，宏观理论和货币政策等。研究成果发表于Review of Financial Studies、Management Science、《经济研究》、《世界经济》等国内外顶尖期刊。

文章题目 (Title)：Uncertainty and Corporate Real Estate Investment: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

文章摘要 (Abstract)：In this paper, we provide a new explanation for the heated real estate investment in China. We find that when facing higher uncertainty, Chinese non-real estate firms would invest more on real estate for hedging against the risk. It is driven by the belief that the Chinese government would utilize the real estate industry to boost nation’s economy, especially during the higher uncertainty period. Through matching the non-real estate listed firm data with over one million parcels transactions from 2005 through 2015 in China, we document a positive correlation between uncertainty and land investment. We offer two channels for explaining such positive correlation. First, firms with poor performance in their main business will invest more in real estate during the high uncertainty period for earning profits. Second, in the presence of adjustment costs, firms associated with high degree of irreversibility would invest more in real estate.

3. 袁涛 (Prof. Tao Yuan)

个人简介 (Bio)：南京大学商学院助理教授，博士毕业于香港城市大学经济与金融系，他的研究领域主要为公司金融，包括企业科技创新，IPO，CEO薪酬等。研究成果已发表在Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，主持一项国家自然科学基金研究项目，同时他还是特许金融分析师（CFA）持证人。

文章题目 (Title)：Trademark Protection and CEO Risk Incentives

文章摘要 (Abstract)：We study the impact of trademark protection on risk incentives in CEO compensation contracts. Using the Federal Trademark Dilution Act as an exogenous shock on the legal protection of trademarks, our difference-in-differences estimation shows that stronger trademark protection induces firms to increase CEO risk incentives as measured by CEO portfolio vega. The positive impact of trademark protection on vega is greater for firms operating in a more competitive environment, with higher innovation intensiveness, and with weaker corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that, by creating monopoly power in the product market, stronger trademark protection entrenches CEOs enjoying a quiet life while shareholders provide more risk incentives in the compensation design to motivate risk-taking.

4. 倪骁然 (Prof. Xiaoran Ni)

个人简介 (Bio)：倪骁然，2012年、2017年于清华大学经济管理学院分别获得经济学学士、应用经济学（金融学方向）博士学位。2015年9月-2016年9月在美国密歇根大学（安娜堡分校）罗斯商学院接受联合培养。现任厦门大学经济学院、王亚南经济研究院助理教授。主要研究领域为公司金融，当前研究专长主要包括利益相关者视角下的公司治理、制度变化与企业行为、企业信息环境。在《经济研究》（2篇）、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》、《金融研究》（2篇）、《中国工业经济》、Journal of Corporate Finance（4篇）、Journal of Banking and Finance（2篇）等国内外重要学术期刊发表论文20余篇。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目。多次获得国际国内学术会议最佳论文奖。

文章题目 (Title)：Does Mandatory Innovation Disclosure Matter for Stock Price Crash Risk? Evidence from American Inventor’s Protection Act

文章摘要 (Abstract)：Employing the passage of the American Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA) that requires firms’ patent applications to be published 18 months after filing, as a quasi-exogenous shock to innovation disclosure, we find that accelerated innovation disclosure results in higher stock price crash risk. This effect is stronger among firms whose innovation process tends to generate more bad news and are technologically closer to their peers, and becomes less prominent when trade secret protection is stronger. Further analysis reveals that firms more affected by AIPA tend to strategically adjust towards less conservative financial reporting and sustaining higher discretionary accruals. Overall, we document that mandated timelier disclosure on patenting may induce managers to strategically garble information, which potentially increases stock price crash risk.

5. 李江远 (Prof. Jiangyuan Li)

个人简介 (Bio)：上海财经大学助理教授，2020年毕业于新加坡管理大学，获金融学博士学位。论文发表于国际顶级金融学期刊Journal of Financial Economics，国际著名金融学期刊Journal of Banking and Finance和国际著名运筹学期刊European Journal of Operational Research。

文章题目 (Title)：When and where the market notices the inequality? Evidence from the mass shooting

文章摘要 (Abstract)：I investigate the cross-sectional inequality-return relationship in the equity market from a geographical angle. I document that the negative inequality-return relationship (Campbell et al. 2016 and Toda and Walsh 2019) still holds in cross-sectional level. Additionally, the negative inequality-return relationship is largely driven by the firms that locate on mass shooting treated regions and mass shooting periods. I attribute the empirical fact to attention channel that after observing long-term cooccurrence between inequality increase and mass shootings, public attention to inequality issues would be spurred when treated by a mass shooting

6. 林晚发 (Prof. Wanfa Lin)

个人简介 (Bio)：林晚发，会计学博士，betway必威副教授，研究方向为信用评级与债券定价，以第一作者在《中国工业经济》、《金融研究》、《会计研究》、《审计研究》、Annals of Economics and Finance、Finance Research Letters、China Journal of Accounting Studies与China Journal of Accounting Research等期刊发表论文20多篇。主持国家自然科学基金一项，教育部人文社科项目一项，参与社科重大项目一项。

文章题目 (Title)：债券担保、评级定制与发行市场信息效率 Bond Guarantee, Rating Customization and Issuance Market Information Efficiency

文章摘要 (Abstract)：企业债券融资同时具有事前逆向选择和事后道德风险两方面的信息摩擦，而债券担保与评级是两个标准的市场化解决机制。然而债券发行企业与评级机构配合实施的评级定制行为，却可能大幅降低债券发行市场的信息效率，导致定价失准。为了深入剖析这个问题，本文首先构建了一个理论模型，对评级定制行为和债券市场信息效率进行了机制刻画。在此基础上，本文利用我国公司债在交易所发行交易需要满足2A债项评级这个制度背景，系统检验了债券担保、评级对债券发行定价的影响。实证结果显示，我国债券市场的确存在评级定制问题：企业有动机通过增加担保以提高债券评级，造成评级“虚高”以及担保“失效”，降低了债券发行市场的信息效率。但同时，债券投资者也具有一定的评级定制甄别能力，对含担保债券提高了发行利率，获得风险溢价补偿。详尽的异质性检验和机制检验进一步巩固了实证结果的稳健性。本文的理论与实证结果说明，为了进一步推动直接融资市场高质量发展，需要统一考虑债券担保与评级制度体系，切实提高债券市场信息效率。Corporate bond financing has both the information friction of pre-adverse selection and post-mortal hazard, and bond guarantee and rating are two standard market-based solutions. However, the customized behavior of bond issuing companies and rating agencies in cooperation with the implementation of ratings may significantly reduce the information efficiency of the bond issuance market, leading to inaccurate pricing. In order to analyze this issue in depth, this article first constructed a theoretical model to describe the mechanism of rating customization behavior and bond market information efficiency. On this basis, this article uses the institutional background that my country’s corporate bonds are issued and traded on exchanges that need to meet 2A debt ratings to systematically examine the impact of bond guarantees and ratings on bond issuance pricing. The empirical results show that there is indeed a problem of rating customization in my country's bond market: companies have the motive to increase bond ratings by increasing guarantees, resulting in "false high" ratings and "invalidation" of guarantees, reducing the information efficiency of the bond issuance market. But at the same time, bond investors also have a certain ability to customize ratings, increase the issuance rate of bonds with guarantees, and obtain risk premium compensation. The detailed heterogeneity test and mechanism test further consolidate the robustness of the empirical results. The theoretical and empirical results of this article show that in order to further promote the high-quality development of the direct financing market, it is necessary to consider the bond guarantee and rating system to effectively improve the information efficiency of the bond market.