讲座题目：Optimal Dynamic Inspection

　　报告人：Eilon Solan

　　报告时间：2019年9月18日 上午10:00-11:30

　　报告地点：经管院A208

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　主持人：李晓蹊

　　摘要:We study a discounted repeated inspection game with two agents and one regulator. Both agents may profit by violating certain rules, while the regulator can inspect at most one agent in each period, inflicting a punishment on an agent who is caught violating the rules. The goal of the regulator is to minimize the discounted number of violations, and she has a commitment power. We identify the regulator’s optimal inspection strategy, and show that it significantly outperforms the inspection strategies studied in the literature.

　　简介 ：Eilon Solan现为以色列特拉维夫大学统计与运筹学系教授，世界知名的博弈论、概率论专家，在随机博弈、马尔可夫决策过程、社会学习等领域做出了众多突出科学贡献。他的研究成果发表于PNAS、Annals of Probability、Annals of Statistics, Econometrica、Operations Research、SIAM Control and Optimization、Mathematics of Operations Research、Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economics Behavior等高水平学术期刊。多年来一直担任多个国际学术期刊编委，目前Eilon Solan教授还是以色列和特拉维夫大学多个拔尖学生科学项目的负责人，如Beno Arbel Program，Good To Know project, training program of the Israeli team to the International Mathematics Olympiad。Eilon Solan教授也是多个计算机技术专利的共同发明人，他与同事在1997年最早申请了如今广泛使用的验证码专利技术CAPTCHA。