讲座题目：Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice

　　报告人：唐前锋(副教授，上海财经大学)

　　报告时间：2017年5月8日15:30—17:00

　　报告地点：经管院B127

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　摘要：We propose a new notion of weak stability for two-sided matching problems. A matching is said to be weakly stable if matching any of its blocking pairs inevitably creates new blocking pairs. We then apply this concept to school choice and study its compatibility with the Pareto efficiency of students’ welfare. Our main result shows that if a matching Pareto dominates the student-optimal stable matching for the students, then it is weakly stable if and only if it is more stable than the outcome of Kesten’s efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) for some consenting constraint. We also provide a test for weak stability by showing that a matching is weakly stable if and only if it is as stable as the EADAM outcome which uses its set of blocking pairs as the consenting constraint.

　　简介：唐前锋，2006年毕业于华中科技大学，获得经济、数学双学位;2011年毕业于德州大学奥斯汀分校，获得经济学博士学位。现任职上海财经大学。研究领域市场设计、博弈论。已在Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior等发表数篇论文。