讲座题目：Sequential Screening with Hidden Actions

　　报告人：刘斌(香港中文大学(深圳)，助理教授)

　　报告时间：2018年5月17日14:00—15:30

　　报告地点：经管院B226

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　摘要：One common insight in the sequential screening literature (e.g., Courty and Li, 2000, and Eső and Szentes, 2007) is that the allocation (implemented in the second stage) is in general discriminatory over the first stage types. In this paper, we study how introducing a first-stage type-enhancing hidden action of the agent would affect the degree of discrimination at the optimum in a two-stage procurement setting where the agent can make costly unobservable investment to improve his first stage type, which is the distribution of his second-stage realized private cost of delivering the product. The principal's goal is to minimize the expected procurement cost. We find that the introduction of moral hazard unambiguously mitigates the allocative discrimination in the second stage. In particular, the second stage mechanism can even be non-discriminatory when the marginal cost of investment is small enough.

　　简介：刘斌博士毕业于新加坡国立大学，主要研究就方向包括机制设计、产业组织理论。已在Journal of Economic Theory、RAND Journal of Economics等顶尖期刊发表若干篇论文。