讲座题目：Coordination on Networks

　　报告人：周俊杰(新加坡国立大学，助理教授)

　　报告时间：2018年4月24日13:00—14:30

　　报告地点：经管院B226

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　摘要：We study a coordination game among agents on a network, who choose whether or not to take an action that yields value increasing in the actions of neighbors. In a standard global game setting, players receive noisy information of the technology’s common state-dependent value. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure equilibrium in the noiseless limit. We derive limiting cutoffs, which allocate players into coordination sets, within members take a common cutoff strategy and are path connected. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for agents to inhabit the same coordination set. The strategic effects of perturbations to players’ underlining values are shown to spread throughout but be contained within the perturbed players’ coordination sets. Welfare properties are investigated.

　　简介：周俊杰，新加坡国立大学经济系助理教授。2012年毕业于加州大学伯克利分校。主要研究兴趣为Economics of networks, IO, Game Theory。在相关领域主流期刊发表论文十余篇，包括Journal of Economic Theory, Rand Journal of Economics, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Games and Economic Behavior, Operations Research, Economic Journal, Production and Operations Management等。