题目：The Elephant in the Board Room, Evidence on Party Control and Firm Value

　　报告人：曹夏平，中山大学，教授

　　时间：2018年7月6日(周五)9:30~11:30

　　地点：经管院B226

　　报告摘要如下：

　　Whether shareholders will better off with enhanced control of corporate decisions is a central issue in economics and finance. We exploit a quasi-natural experiment in which Chinese government announced to elevate Communist Party of China (CPC)’s control in the board of SOEs. The event analysis shows stock prices of SOEs drops by 1% compared to non-SOEs. The negative value decline is confirmed by mainland SOEs listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The degree of political control in place, board structure, and external oversight determines the variations in value loss associated with CPC’s role in the board. Our research suggests that political control destroys firm value.

　　报告人简介：

　　曹夏平，2008年毕业于美国波士顿学院，获金融学博士学位，现为中山大学岭南学院金融系教授、中山大学南方金融科技研究院院长、岭南学院博士项目主任，研究领域包括上市融资、IPO制度、股权结构、风险投资、私募股权投资，在Journal of Financial Economics、Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis、Management Science、Journal of Business Ethics、Journal of Banking and Finance等发表论文多篇。