讲座题目：Non-linear Incentives and Worker Productivity: Evidence from a

Quasi-experiment

　　 Richard B. Freeman, Wei Huang, and Teng Li

　　报告人：Prof. Wei Huang，National University of Singapore

　　报告时间：2018年10月16日下午3:30-5:00

　　报告地点:B247

　　主办单位：经济系

　　摘要：How workers respond to non-linear incentives is of central interest among economists. Using a unique quasi-experiment in a large insurance company and associated detailed personnel data, this paper examines the effects of an exogenous change to the non-linear incentive scheme on sales-agent productivity. Among the agents who are eligible for the new incentive scheme, we find a remarkable increase in their productivity measured by insurance commission and a significantly lowered turnover rate. Although the non-linear incentive scheme deteriorated the moral hazard problem (e.g., bunching performance, fewer sales of un-incentivized insurance products, and more withdrew insurance contracts), the related losses were far outweighed by the benefits. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the profit of the company increased by about 5%.

　　简介：黄炜博士是新加坡国立大学President’s Assistant Professor。在加入新加坡国立大学之前，黄博士是NBER老龄化与健康经济学博士后研究员。黄博士于2016年获得哈佛大学经济学博士学位。他的研究领域包括公共经济学、劳动经济学和卫生经济学。他对健康、教育、种族和中国等话题感兴趣。他的研究成果发表在Review of Economic and Statistics, Journal of Labor Economics, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Nature, Journal of Economic Perspectives, etc. 他同时担任Economics of Transition杂志的编辑。