讲座题目： Budget-balancing Public Goods Provision in Large Group: Belief, Information, and Repetition

　　报告人：Yun Wang(WISE, Xiamen University， 助理教授)

　　报告时间：2018年9月6日(周四)上午10:00-11:30

　　报告地点：经管院B249

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系，主持人：李晓蹊

　　摘要: This paper investigates threshold-public-goods provision with budget-balancing condition. The condition is achieved through rebate policies. In addition to the proportional rebate (PR) and winner-take-all (WTA) rebate policies from the literature, we introduce two novel rules: the uniform price cap (UPC) and the uniform price auction (UPA). Both feature endogenously determined prices and discriminatory payment rules. We conduct two large-group experiments to examine the efficiency property of these rebate policies. Our results show that, over-contribution exists and efficient provision rates are higher under the UPC and UPA mechanisms, while over-contribution does not appear under the PR or WTA rebate rules. The latter result differs from the findings of Ronbeau et.al.(1999) and Spencer et.al.(2009), in which the provision threshold is unknown to subjects.

　　简介: Yun Wang is an assistant professor at WISE, Xiamen University. She received her PhD in economics from the University of Pittsburgh in 2013. Her main research areas are game theory, behavioural economics, and experimental economics. Her current theoretical research revolves around games of information transmission, in particular Bayesian persuasion and its applications in political economy. Her experimental research includes trust and social preferences, public goods games, mechanism design problems in the lab, epistemology, and other behavioural-psychology related topics.