讲座题目：Dynamic Project Assignment

　　报告人：何暐(香港中文大学)

　　报告时间：2018年11月12日10:30—11:30

　　报告地点：经管院A208教室

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　摘要：We consider a project assignment problem where a Principal needs to assign multiple projects to a long-lived Agent. The Agent is privately informed about her cost, which evolves stochastically over time. To fully characterize the optimal mechanism, we identify the key trade-off of the Principal, which is the comparison between the benefit from an immediate assignment at high cost and the payoff from a delayed assignment at low cost. We show that the capacity constraint can reduce the payoff of the Principal and create a “hold-up” problem by comparing the limit of the optimal payoffs of the Principal when the capacity constraint is present, with the Principal's optimal payoff when the capacity constraint is absent.

　　简介：何暐教授于2010年本科毕业于北京大学，2014、2016年分别取得新加坡国立大学数学博士学位和爱荷华大学经济学博士学位，现任职香港中文大学。已于Journal of Economic Theory、Theoretical Economics、Games and Economic Behavior等顶级期刊发表论文十余篇。现为Economic Theory副主编。