讲座题目：Screening with Network Externalities

　　报告人：邢亦青

　　报告时间：2018年12月21日(周五)下午14点00分

　　报告地点：经管院A208

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　主持人：肖明军

　　摘要:We develop a model in which a profit-maximizing monopoly sells a product with positive network externalities and optimally screen buyers' network information: their susceptibility (out-degree) and influence (in-degree). We characterize the optimal allocation for both the case of directed networks where each buyer's influence and susceptibility are independent, and the case of undirected networks where the two are identical.

　　In the case of directed networks, we show the optimal allocation can only depend on a buyer's susceptibility and linear in virtual type (susceptibility) with quadratic intrinsic value. In the case of undirected networks, we disentangle the different effects of influence and susceptibility on optimal allocation and show with quadratic intrinsic value, the allocation is a linear combination of a buyer's type and virtual type. Then we contrast the model with complete information pricing and pure screening and show that apart from the screening effects, positive network externalities increase each buyer's allocation at the optimal selling mechanism. We also extend the model to accommodate for weak positive affiliation between a buyer's influence and susceptibility, and the situation where influence and susceptibility are endogenous to the optimal allocation.

　　简介：邢亦青，约翰霍普金斯大学经济学助教授。北京大学大学数学、经济学学士、硕士，Stanford经济学博士，现任约翰霍普金斯大学Carey商学院助理教授，主要研究领域为：Microeconomic Theory, Social Networks, and Experimental Economics。邢亦青博士曾在Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences，Review of Economic Design，Economics Letters等国际刊物上发表过论文。