讲座题目：Optimal Nonlinear Pricing by a Dominant Firm under Competition

　　报告人： 朝镛(路易斯维尔大学商学院副教授)

　　报告时间：2019年5月15日(周三)下午 14：00 -15:30

　　报告地点：经管院B127

　　主办单位：数理经济与数理金融系

　　主持人：崔静波

　　摘要: We consider the nonlinear pricing problem faced by a dominant firm which competes with a capacity-constrained minor firm for a downstream buyer who may purchase the product from one or both firms under complete information. In particular, we analyze a three-stage game in which the dominant firm offers a general tariff first and then the minor firm responds with a per-unit price, followed by the buyer choosing her purchases from both firms. By establishing an equivalence between the subgame perfect equilibrium of our asymmetric competition game and the optimal mechanism in a “virtual” principal-agent model, we characterize the dominant firm's optimal nonlinear tariff. The optimal tariff exhibits convexity, and meanwhile can display quantity discounts. We thus provide a rationale for nonlinear pricing under competition in the absence of private information: The dominant firm can use unchosen offers to constrain its rival's possible deviations and extract more surplus from the buyer. Antitrust implications of our analysis are also discussed.

　　简介 ：朝镛，路易斯维尔大学商学院副教授，研究方向为产业组织理论，反垄断理论与政策，双边市场理论和实证。在经济学和管理学国际顶级期刊发表论文多篇，包括American Economic Review、Management Science、RAND Journal of Economics、International Economic Review等。