讲座题目：Optimal royalty auction with bidder heterogeneity and seller moral hazard

主讲人：徐欣毅 中山大学岭南学院

时间：2022年5月26日14:00

地点：腾讯会议896-901-823

讲座主要内容：

This paper studies optimal royalty auction design when bidders are heterogeneous in type distributions, and seller moral hazard arises in the form of post-auction effort input. By the communication revelation principle, we first characterize all incentive compatible, individual rational, and sequential rational direct mechanisms (feasible direct mechanisms). Then, we apply the inequalities for the covariance of monotone functions to derive the upper bound of seller’s expected payoff for all feasible direct mechanisms and provide a mechanism to attain the upper bound, which is called the optimal royalty auction mechanism. The optimal mechanism selects the bidder of the highest non-negative virtual surplus among all participants and generates a deterministic post-auction effort recommendation for the seller. We construct a“quasi-dominant strategy”royalty auction that uses the information of the first and the second highest bids to implement the optimal mechanism. We then consider discrimination in allocation and winner’s payment. Lastly, we discuss the impact of royalty rate, and compare the characteristics and discrimination of the optimal auctions with that in the case of post-auction perfect information.

主讲人简介：

徐欣毅，中山大学岭南学院助理教授，于2017年毕业于香港中文大学，获经济学博士学位。主要研究领域为契约理论和机制设计。研究成果发表于Journal of Mathematical Economics.主持国家课题一项。