讲座题目：Ambiguous Persuasion in Contests

主讲人：冯欣  南京大学商学院

时间：2022年5月19日14:00

地点：腾讯会议414-365-596

讲座主要内容：

We study optimal information disclosure via an ambiguous persuasion approach in a two-player contest. The designer can precommit to an ambiguous device to influence the uninformed contestant's belief about his opponent' s private type. We fully characterize the optimal ambiguous information structures when players are maxmin expected utility (MMEU) maximizers. Depending on the prior, it is optimal either to induce maximal ambiguity or to simply use deterministic information policies. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which an effort-maximizing organizer can benefit strictly more from using ambiguous persuasion than from using the optimal Bayesian device.

主讲人简介：

冯欣，南京大学商学院副教授，新加坡国立大学经济学博士。主要研究领域为应用微观理论，具体包括拍卖理论、竞赛理论、信息设计等。研究成果发表(含接受)于American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Journal of Public Economics, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters等经济学学术期刊。