讲座题目：Strategic Hospital Runs

报告人：陈琬祎，中国科学技术大学管理学院特任副教授/特任副研究员

报告时间：3月24日（周三）下午14:00

报告地点：经管院B249

主办单位：betway必威数理经济与数理金融系

主持人：孙祥

内容摘要：Hospital runs are of primary concern in a pandemic and are especially devastating when non-severe patients crowd out severe ones. We study a rushing game for hospital service. The fear of future scarcity may drive non-severe patients to inefficiently seek early treatment. The forward-looking nature induces a chain effect–expecting a far future run realizes the near future run, which in turn induces the current run. This feature triggers the run long before the capacity is insufficient for severe patients. Due to strategic rushing, a higher capacity may induce more devastating hospital crowding out. On the other hand, inefficient waiting can also occur. A planner would allocate a fraction of medical resources to non-urgent patients to alleviate future congestion, but individuals do not consider this externality of future overload. Besides, the strategic complementarity can also lead to self-fulling runs. We characterize conditions for such scenarios to occur.

主讲人简介：陈琬祎，中国科学技术大学管理学院特任副教授/特任副研究员。2018年毕业于美国威斯康辛大学麦迪逊分校，获经济学博士学位。2011年毕业于betway必威数理经济与数理金融实验班，获得金融学与应用数学学位。主要研究领域为信息经济学、博弈论，和应用微观经济学。